This paper considers the problem of secret communication over a two-receiver multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) Gaussian broadcast channel. The transmitter has two independent messages, each of which is intended for one of the receivers but needs to be kept asymptotically perfectly secret from the other. It is shown that, surprisingly, under a matrix power constraint, both messages can be simultaneously transmitted at their respective maximal secrecy rates. To prove this result, the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel is revisited and a new characterization of its secrecy capacity is provided via a new coding scheme that uses artificial noise (an additive prefix channel) and random binning.
I. INTRODUCTION
R APID advances in wireless technology are quickly moving us toward a pervasively connected world in which a vast array of wireless devices, from iPhones to biosensors, seamlessly communicate with one another. The openness of the wireless medium makes wireless transmission especially susceptible to eavesdropping. Hence, security and privacy issues have become increasingly critical for wireless networks. Although wireless technologies are becoming more and more secure, eavesdroppers are also becoming smarter. Therefore, tackling security at the very basic physical layer is of critical importance.
In this paper, we study the problem of secret communication over a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) Gaussian broadcast channel with two receivers. The transmitter is equipped with transmit antennas, and receiver , , is equipped Manuscript received March 23, 2009; revised April 14, 2010. Date of current version August 18, 2010. This work was supported in part by the U.S. National Science Foundation under Grants CCF-07-28208, CCF-08-45848, and CNS-09-05398; in part by the European Commission in the framework of the FP7 Network of Excellence in Wireless Communications NEWCOM++; and in part by the Israel Science Foundation. The material in this paper was presented in part at the 2009 with receive antennas. A discrete-time sample of the channel can be written as (1) where is the (real) channel matrix of size , and is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) additive vector Gaussian noise process with zero mean and identity covariance matrix. The channel input is subject to a matrix power constraint (2) where is a positive semidefinite matrix, and " " denotes "less than or equal to" in the positive semidefinite ordering between real symmetric matrices (see Appendix A for some related definitions of semidefinite matrices partial ordering). Note that (2) is a rather general power constraint that subsumes many other important power constraints including the average total and per-antenna power constraints as special cases.
Consider the communication scenario in which there are two independent messages and at the transmitter. Message is intended for receiver 1 but needs to be kept secret from receiver 2, and message is intended for receiver 1 but needs to be kept secret from receiver 2 (see Fig. 1 for an illustration of this communication scenario). The confidentiality of the messages at the unintended receivers is measured using the normalized information-theoretic criteria (weak secrecy) [1] , [2] and
where , and the limits are taken as the block length . The goal is to characterize the entire secrecy rate region that can be 0018-9448/$26.00 © 2010 IEEE achieved by any coding scheme. The rate region is usually known as the secrecy capacity region of the channel. In recent years, information-theoretic study of secret MIMO communication has been an active area of research (see [3] for a recent survey of progress in this area). Most noticeably, the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel was characterized in [4] - [6] for the multiple-input single-output (MISO) case and [7] - [10] for the general MIMO case. The secrecy capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with a common and a confidential messages was characterized in [11] . The problem of communicating two confidential messages over the two-receiver MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel was first considered in [12] , where it was shown that under the average total power constraint, secret dirty-paper coding (S-DPC) [13] achieves the secrecy capacity region for the MISO case. For the general MIMO case, however, characterizing the secrecy capacity region remained as an open problem.
II. BROADCAST SECRECY CHANNEL: MAIN RESULTS
The main result of this paper is a precise characterization of the secrecy capacity region of the (general) MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel, summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The secrecy capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) with confidential messages (intended for receiver 1 but needing to be kept secret from receiver 2) and (intended for receiver 2 but needing to be kept secret from receiver 1) under the matrix power constraint (2) is given by the set of nonnegative rate pairs such that and (4) where denotes the identity matrix of size . Note that the rate region (4) is rectangular. This implies that under the matrix power constraint, both confidential messages and can be simultaneously transmitted at their respective maximal secrecy rates as if over two separate MIMO Gaussian wiretap channels. In other words, the upper bound on in (4) is the secrecy capacity 1 of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel (1) with receiver 1 being the legitimate receiver and receiver 2 being the eavesdropper; while the upper bound on in (4) is the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel (1) with receiver 2 being the legitimate receiver and receiver 1 being the eavesdropper. Also note that if is an optimal solution to the optimization problem (5) then simultaneously maximizes both objective functions on the right-hand side (RHS) of (4).
It is rather surprising to see that under the matrix power constraint, both confidential messages and can be simultaneously transmitted at their respective maximal secrecy rates over the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) . As we will see, this is due to the fact that there are in fact two efficient coding schemes: one uses only random binning, and the other uses both random binning and artificial noise. Both of them can achieve the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel. Through S-DPC [13] , both schemes can be simultaneously implemented in communicating confidential messages and over the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1).
Remark 1:
The secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel under a matrix power constraint was first characterized in [9] , by which the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel (1) with receiver 2 being the legitimate receiver and receiver 1 being the eavesdropper can also be represented as (6) By Theorem 1, the secrecy capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) with confidential messages and under the matrix power constraint (2) can also be written as the set of nonnegative rate pairs satisfying and (7) Note, however, that the optimization problems on the RHS of (7) do not, in general, admit the same optimal solution. As we will see, this makes (4) a better choice when it comes to proving the achievability part of the theorem. As a corollary of Theorem 1, we have the following characterization of the secrecy capacity region under the average total power constraint. This is a simple consequence of [14, Lemma 1].
Corollary 1:
The secrecy capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) with confidential messages (intended for receiver 1 but needing to be kept secret from receiver 2) and (intended for receiver 2 but needing to be kept secret from receiver 1) under the average total power constraint (8) is given by (9) Remark 2: Unlike Theorem 1, under the average total power constraint, the secrecy capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel is, in general, not rectangular. This is because the secrecy capacity region is given by the union of over all possible matrix constraints , and each boundary point of may correspond to the corner point of for different matrix constraints . The rest of the paper is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1. As mentioned previously, the rectangular nature of the rate region (4) suggests that the result is intimately connected to the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel. The secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel under the matrix power constraint was previously characterized in [9] , where it was shown that Gaussian random binning without prefix coding is optimal. In Section III, we revisit the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel problem and show that Gaussian random binning with prefix coding can also achieve the secrecy capacity, provided that the prefix channel is appropriately chosen. In Section IV, we prove Theorem 1 using two different characterizations of the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel and S-DPC [13] . Numerical examples are provided in Section V to illustrate the theoretical results. Finally, in Section VI, we conclude the paper with some remarks.
III. MIMO GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL REVISITED
In this section, we revisit the problem of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel under a matrix power constraint. The problem was first considered in [9] , where a precise characterization of the secrecy capacity was provided. The goal of this section is to provide an alternative characterization of the secrecy capacity which will facilitate the proof of Theorem 1. More specifically, we wish to provide a MIMO wiretap channel bound on the secrecy rate which will match the RHS of (4). For that purpose, consider again the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) but this time with only one confidential message at the transmitter. Message is intended for receiver 2 (the legitimate receiver) but needs to be kept secret from receiver 1 (the eavesdropper). The confidentiality of at receiver 1 is measured using the normalized information-theoretic criteria [1] , [2] (10)
The channel input is subject to the matrix power constraint (2) . The goal is to characterize the secrecy capacity , which is the maximum achievable secrecy rate for message . This communication scenario, as illustrated in Fig. 2 , is widely known as the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel [4] - [9] .
In their seminal work [2] , Csiszár and Körner provided a single-letter characterization of the secrecy capacity (11) where is an auxiliary variable, and the maximization is over all jointly distributed such that forms a Markov chain and . Here, denotes the mutual information between and . As shown in [2] , the secrecy rate on the RHS of (11) can be achieved by a coding scheme that combines random binning and prefix coding [2] . More specifically, the auxiliary variable represents a precoding signal, and the conditional distribution of given represents the prefix channel. In [9] , Liu and Shamai further studied the optimization problem on the RHS of (11) and showed that a Gaussian is an optimal solution. Hence, a matrix characterization of the secrecy capacity is given by [9] (12) Thus, Gaussian random binning without prefix coding is an optimal coding strategy for the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel.
Next, we show that a different coding scheme that combines Gaussian random binning and prefix coding can also achieve the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel. This leads to a new characterization of the secrecy capacity as summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) with a confidential message (intended for receiver 2 but needing to be kept secret from receiver 1) under the matrix power constraint (2) is given by (13) Remark 3: The achievability of the secrecy rate on the RHS of (13) can be obtained from the Csiszár-Körner expression (11) by choosing , where and are two independent Gaussian vectors with zero means and covariance matrices and , respectively. This choice of differs from that for (12) in two important ways: 1) In (13), the input vector always takes the full covariance matrix . For (12), the covariance matrix of needs to be chosen to solve an optimization program; the full covariance matrix is not always an optimal solution. 2) In (13) , the conditional distribution of given may form a nontrivial prefix channel. For (12), so prefix coding is never applied.
Remark 4: Note that the prefix channel in (13) is an additive vector Gaussian noise channel, so the auxiliary variable represents an artificial noise [15] sent (on purpose) by the transmitter to confuse the eavesdropper. Since the artificial noise has no structure to it, it will add to the noise floor at both legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper.
The converse part of the theorem can be proved using a channel-enhancement argument, similar to that in [9] . The details of the proof are provided in Appendix B.
IV. MIMO GAUSSIAN BROADCAST CHANNEL WITH CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES
In this section, we prove Theorem 1. To prove the converse part of the theorem, we will consider a single-message, wiretap channel bound on the secrecy rates and . More specifically, note that both messages and can be transmitted at the maximum secrecy rate when the other message is absent from the transmission. Therefore, to bound from above the secrecy rate , we assume that only needs to be communicated over the channel. This is precisely a MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel problem with receiver 1 as legitimate receiver and receiver 2 as eavesdropper. Reversing the roles of receiver 1 and 2, we have from (12) that (14) Similarly, to bound from above the secrecy rate , let us assume that only needs to be communicated over the channel. This is, again, a MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel problem with receiver 2 playing the role of legitimate receiver and receiver 1 playing the role of eavesdropper. By Theorem 2 (15) Putting together (14) and (15), we have proved the converse part of the theorem.
Next, we show that every rate pair within the secrecy rate region (4) is achievable. Note that (4) is rectangular, so we only need to show that the corner point given by
and (16) is achievable.
Recall from [13] that for any jointly distributed such that forms a Markov chain and , the secrecy rate pair given by
and (17) is achievable for the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) under the matrix power constraint (2) . In [13] , the achievability of the rate pair (17) Finally, let be an optimal solution to the optimization program (5) . As mentioned previously in Section II, such a choice will simultaneously maximize the RHS of (23) and (27). Thus, the corner point (16) is indeed achievable. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Remark 5: Note that in standard dirty-paper coding (DPC), the precoding matrix is chosen to cancel the known interference. In our scheme, such a choice plays two important roles. First, it helps to cancel the precoding signal representing message , so message sees an interference-free legitimate receiver channel. Second, it helps to boost the security for message by causing interference to the corresponding eavesdropper. For this reason, we call our scheme S-DPC, to differentiate it from the standard DPC.
Remark 6:
In S-DPC, both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper for message are interference free. On the other hand, for message , both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are subject to interference from the precoding signal representing message . As we have seen in Section III, the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel can be achieved with or without interference in place. Therefore, both secrecy capacity achieving schemes can be simultaneously implemented via S-DPC to simultaneously communicate both confidential messages at their respective maximal secrecy rates.
V. COMPUTATION OF SECRECY CAPACITY AND
NUMERICAL EXAMPLES In this section, we provide numerical examples to illustrate the secrecy capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel with confidential messages. As shown in (4) and (9), under both matrix and average total power constraints, the secrecy capacity regions and are expressed in terms of matrix optimization programs (though implicit in (9)). In general, these optimization programs are not convex, and hence, finding the boundary of the secrecy capacity regions is nontrivial.
In [12] , a precise characterization of the secrecy capacity region was obtained for the MISO Gaussian broadcast channel using the generalized eigenvalue decomposition [17, Ch. 6.3]. For the aligned MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel, [10] provided an explicit, closed-form expression for the secrecy capacity. In the following, we generalize the results of [10] and [12] to the general MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel under the matrix power constraint.
Let , , be the generalized eigenvalues of the pencil (see Appendix A for the definition of matrix pencil)
Since both and are strictly positive definite, we have for . Without loss of generality, we may assume that these generalized eigenvalues are ordered as (29) i.e., a total of of them are assumed to be greater than 1. We have the following characterization of the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel under the matrix power constraint, which is a natural extension of [10] .
Theorem 3: The secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) with confidential message (intended for receiver 1 but needing to be kept secret from receiver 2) under the matrix power constraint (2) is given by (30) where , , are the generalized eigenvalues of the pencil (28) that are greater than 1.
Remark 7: Note that is invertible, so computing the generalized eigenvalues of the pencil (28) can be reduced to the problem of finding standard eigenvalues of a related semidefinite matrix [17, Ch. 6.3]. Hence, the secrecy capacity expression (30) is computable.
A proof of the theorem following the approach of [10] is provided in Appendix C. As a corollary, we have the following characterization of the secrecy capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential messages under the matrix power constraint.
Corollary 2:
The secrecy capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) with confidential messages (intended for receiver 1 but needing to be kept secret from receiver 2) and (intended for receiver 2 but needing to be kept secret from receiver 1) under the matrix constraint (2) is given by the set of nonnegative rate pairs such that and (31)
where , , are the generalized eigenvalues of the pencil (28) that are greater than 1, and , , are the generalized eigenvalues of the pencil (28) that are less than or equal to 1.
A proof of Corollary 2 is deferred to Appendix D. Under the average total power constraint, we have not been able to find a computable secrecy capacity expression for the general MIMO case. We can, however, write the secrecy capacity region under the average total power constraint as in (9) . For any given matrix constraint , can be computed as given by (31). Then, the secrecy capacity region can be found through an exhaustive search over the set of matrices . Note that, each boundary point may correspond to the corner point of for different matrix constraints . Hence, under the average total power constraint, the secrecy capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel is not rectangular in general.
Let , , , and , and let
The secrecy capacity regions , , and are illustrated in Fig. 3 . For comparison, we have also plotted the secrecy rate regions achieved by the simple zero-forcing (ZF) strategy. In ZF, each of the confidential messages is encoded using a vector Gaussian signal. To guarantee confidentiality, the covariance matrices of the transmit signals are chosen in the null space of the channel matrix at the unintended receiver. Hence, the achievable secrecy rate region is given by (33), shown at the bottom of the page. Note that unlike the secrecy capacity region expression (9) , computing the rate region (33) only involves solving convex optimization programs. As shown in Fig. 3 , in all four scenarios, ZF is strictly suboptimal as compared with (33) S-DPC. In particular, if the channel matrix of the unintended receiver has full row rank, ZF cannot achieve any positive secrecy rate for the corresponding confidential message. On the other hand, S-DPC can always achieve positive secrecy rates for both confidential messages unless the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel is degraded.
Finally, let
and (36) Fig. 4 illustrates the secrecy capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) under the matrix power constraint (2) . Here, the secrecy capacity region is plotted based on the computable expression (31). Also in the figure are the secrecy rate region achieved by ZF strategy and the nonsecrecy capacity region achieved by standard DPC [14] . As expected, we have .
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have considered the problem of communicating two confidential messages over a two-receiver MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel. Each of the confidential messages is intended for one of the receivers but needs to be kept asymptotically perfectly secret from the other. Precise characterizations of the secrecy capacity region have been provided under both matrix and average total power constraints. Surprisingly, under the matrix power constraint, both confidential messages can be transmitted simultaneously at their respective maximal secrecy rates.
To prove this result, we have revisited the problem of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel and proposed a new coding scheme that achieves the secrecy capacity of the channel. Unlike the previous scheme considered in [4] - [9] where prefix coding is not applied, the new coding scheme uses artificial vector Gaussian noise as a way of prefix coding. Moreover, the optimal covariance matrix of the artificial noise coincides with that of the transmit signal in the previous scheme (with a reversal of the roles of legitimate receiver and eavesdropper). This allows both schemes to be overlayed via secret dirty-paper coding without sacrificing the secrecy rate performance for either of them. We believe that the new insights into the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel problem gained in this work will help to solve some other MIMO Gaussian secret communication problems.
APPENDIX A SOME MATRIX NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
Below we summarize various properties of symmetric positive semidefinite matrices that are used in this paper.
1) Semidefinite Matrices and Partial Ordering: An real symmetric matrix is positive semidefinite if for all nonzero vectors with real entries ( ), where denotes the transpose of ; is positive definite if for all nonzero vectors with real entries.
If is positive semidefinite, we write and if is positive-definite we writes . For arbitrary square matrices and , we write (or ) if , i.e., is positive semidefinite. This defines a partial ordering on the set of all real symmetric matrices. Similarly, we define a strict partial ordering (or ) if if . We have the following properties of positive semidefinite matrices:
1) Every positive definite matrix is invertible, and its inverse is also positive definite. Furthermore, if then .
2) If and are positive semidefinite, then the sum and the products and are also positive semidefinite. If , then is also positive semidefinite.
3) A matrix is positive semidefinite if and only if there is a positive semidefinite matrix with . This matrix , called the square root of , is unique and is denoted by . If then .
2) Matrix Pencil and Generalized Eigenvalue: A linear matrix pencil is a matrix-valued function of the form with
, where and are real matrices, and is denoted by . The eigenvalues of a pencil consist of all real numbers for which . The problem of determining the eigenvalues of a matrix pencil can be equivalently formulated as the generalized eigenvalue problem of determining the nontrivial solutions of the equation
The nonzero values of that satisfy (37) are the generalized eigenvalues and the corresponding vectors are the generalized eigenvectors. In particular, if is symmetric and is symmetric and positive definite, the generalized eigenvalues are all real.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In this Appendix, we prove Theorem 2. As mentioned previously in Remark 3, the secrecy rate on the RHS of (13) can be achieved by a coding scheme that combines Gaussian random binning and prefix coding. We, therefore, concentrate on proving the converse part of the theorem.
Following [9] , we will first prove the converse result for the special case where the channel matrices and are square and invertible. Next, we will broaden the result to the general case by approximating arbitrary channel matrices and by square and invertible ones. For brevity, we will term the special case as the aligned MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel and the general case as the general MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel.
1) Aligned MIMO Gaussian Wiretap Channel: Consider the special case of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel (1) where the channel matrices and are square and invertible. Multiplying both sides of (1) by , the channel model can be equivalently written as (38) where is an i.i.d. additive vector Gaussian noise process with zero mean and covariance matrix (39) Denote by the secrecy capacity of (38) (viewed as a MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel with receiver 2 as legitimate receiver and receiver 1 as eavesdropper) under the matrix power constraint (2) . We have the following characterization of .
Lemma 1: The secrecy capacity (40) Proof: The achievability of the secrecy rate on the RHS of (40) can be obtained from the Csiszár-Körner expression (11) by choosing , where and are two independent Gaussian vectors with zero means and covariance matrices and , respectively. To prove the converse result, we will follow [9] and consider a channel-enhancement argument [14] as follows. Let us first assume that . In this case, let be an optimal solution to the optimization problem on the RHS of (40). Then, must satisfy the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions: Note that the matrix power constraint is strictly positive definite, so we can apply the previous result to the new wiretap channel (69). This completes the proof of the lemma.
2) General MIMO Gaussian Wiretap Channel:
For the general case, we may assume that the channel matrices and are square but not necessarily invertible. If that is not the case, we can use singular value decomposition (SVD) to show that there is an equivalent channel which does have square channel matrices. That is, we can find a new channel with square channel matrices which are derived from the original ones via matrix multiplications. The new channel is equivalent to the original one in preserving the secrecy capacity under the same power constraint.
Consider using SVD to write the channel matrices as follows: by letting on the RHS of (80). This completes the proof of the theorem.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 3
In this Appendix, we prove Theorem 3. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the matrix power constraint is strictly positive definite and the channel matrices and are square but not necessarily invertible. We start with the following simple lemma. where the last equality follows from the fact that is invertible. Putting together (87) and (88) proves the equality in (82). This completes the proof of the lemma.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3, following the approach of [10] Note that the pencils (28) and (124) are generated by the same pair of semidefinite matrices but with different order. Therefore, the generalized eigenvalues of the pencil (124) are given by (125) Applying Theorem 3 for and noting the fact that when completes the proof of the corollary.
